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The Btu Tax Experience: What Happened
and Why it Happened
DAWN ERLANDSON*
I. Introduction
President Bill Clinton, in his State of the Union Address
on February 17, 1993, proposed a "broad-based energy tax as
the best way to provide [us with] revenue to lower the deficit,
because [the tax] also combats pollution, promotes energy ef-
ficiency, and promotes the independence economically of the
country, as well as helping to reduce the debt."1
The mere proposal of the Btu tax by the President was a
victory for advocates of pollution taxes. The tax's defeat did
not reveal shortcomings in the Btu2 tax per se or in pollution
taxes in general, but rather it revealed the political animosity
in Washington towards pollution taxes. Although advocates
were able to persuade the Clinton Administration to propose
a broad-based energy tax, they lacked the political capital
and resources to pass the tax through Congress.
* Dawn Erlandson is with Friends of the Earth
1. President Bill Clinton, The State of the Union Address (Feb. 17, 1993),
in The State of the Union: President Clinton's Address, WASH. POST, Feb. 18,
1993, at A24.
2. "By definition, one Btu, or British Thermal Unit, is the quantity of heat
required to raise the temperature of one pound of water from 63 degrees Fahr-
enheit to 64 degrees Fahrenheit." FRANcIs W. SEARs ET AL., UNivssrry PuHs-
ics 359 (7th ed. 1987).
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II. Years of Advocacy Pay Off. A Broad-based Energy
Tax Proposed
Due in large part to Vice President Gore's efforts and en-
dorsement, the Btu tax became a major component of the Ad-
ministration's deficit reduction package.3 Vice President
Gore's support, coupled with a number of additional factors,
set the stage for the acceptance of a broad-based energy tax
by the Clinton Administration.
First, composition of the President's $500 billion deficit
reduction plan had to include a combination of spending cuts
and tax increases.4 The Administration's preferred tax in-
crease, a hike in the income tax rates paid by the wealthy, did
not raise sufficient revenue. The only major sources of reve-
nue were a broad-based consumption tax and a broad-based
energy tax. The Administration chose the energy tax.5
Second, the many years of advocacy and study by envi-
ronmentalists and like-minded economists had paid off.
Power brokers like Vice President Gore and editorial writers
were persuaded that a tax on energy would do double duty by
raising revenue and fighting pollution.6 Third, taxes would
be imposed on bad activities, like pollution, rather than on
good activities like work and investment. Surprisingly, this
concept also found favor with a significant group of chief exec-
utive officers who pledged their support for the broad-based
energy tax.7
3. See generally, SEm. AL GoRE, EARm iN BALANCE: EcoLoGY AND THE
HumAN SPIRT (1992). As part of a Strategic Environmental Initiative (SEI),
Senator Gore proposed tax incentives for new technologies and disincentives for
old technologies. Id. at 359. Older technologies would include high-Btu fuels
such as oil and coal, while newer lower-Btu technologies, such as wind and so-
lar power would be encouraged. Id.
4. Clinton, supra note 1.
5. Basil Talbott, Lobbyists Fired Up to Fight Energy Tax, Cm. SuN-TnIEs,
Feb. 28, 1993, (Sunday News), at 6.
6. Glenda Holste, Common Sense Btu Tax Debate Will Benefit All, Hous.
CHRON., Feb. 24, 1993, at Cll.
7. Michael Parrish, Arco and Unocal Backing Clinton on Btu Tax Plan,
L.A. Tnmds, Feb. 27, 1993, at D1.
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IH. The Energy Tax Takes Shape: A Hybrid Btu Tax
Once the Administration decided to proceed with an en-
ergy tax, the question to answer became which one. A carbon
tax was rejected due to the sole power of Senator Robert Byrd
of coal-rich West Virginia.8 His cooperation would be neces-
sary to ensure that the Administration's stimulus bill, as well
as spending initiatives, would be adopted. A gasoline tax was
rejected because the President specifically denounced it dur-
ing his campaign as "back-breaking." 9 The only two taxes re-
maining were based on fuels. One, the Btu tax, was based on
the heat content of fuels, and the other, an ad valorem tax,
was based on the sales price of fuels.
The environmental community, led by the Sierra Club
and the National Resources Defense Council, successfully ar-
gued against the ad valorem tax.10 The Sierra Club con-
tended that the tax would exacerbate price changes of various
energy sources.1" In addition, environmentalists lobbied for
two critical components of the energy tax. One was for a
structure that favored fuels. The second was for a collection
on the tax point of production, such as the wellhead for oil
and the utility for nuclear, so as to engender maximum effi-
ciency gains through the energy production process.
The final product, a Btu tax with an oil supplement, was
applauded by the environmental community, as were the
composite deficit reduction and stimulus packages. Among
the green provisions of the plan were increases in funding for
transit and clean water infrastructure, increases in grazing
fees, mining royalties, and the elimination of below-cost tim-
ber sales.
The hybrid Btu tax was brilliantly conceived in every
way. It was simple, clean, easy to administer, and raised sig-
8. Clinton to Propose Corporate Tax Hikes; Energy Tax Expected, Sources
Confirm, DAILY TAX REP. (BNA) No. 28, at G-7, 8 (Feb. 12, 1993).
9. White House Considers Energy Tax, Consumption Tax, Officials Con-
firm, DAILY TAX REP. (BNA) No. 15, at G-9, 11 (Jan. 26, 1993) [hereinafter
White House].
10. WRI, NRDC Call for Energy Taxes, Voice Support for Carbon, Gasoline
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nificant revenue. It encouraged cleaner forms of energy, and
thus would cut pollution without being a carbon tax. It taxed
oil at a relatively high rate without being a gasoline tax. Its
incidence was regionally balanced, and measures were at-
tached to cushion the impact on low-income people. In addi-
tion, the impact on the middle class was relatively modest.1 2
IV. The Btu Tax Enters the World of Politics
President Clinton presented a real and significant deficit
reduction package on February 17, 1993 that won plaudits
from many. Democratic party members were on top of the
world. Meanwhile, the Republicans were faced with a choice
between continuing the gridlock in Congress or agreeing with
the President, ending the debate.
Optimistic about the plan, environmentalists urged ac-
tivists around the country to write Members of Congress in
support of the President's plan. Three quarters of the House
and Senate were visited by teams of environmentalists urg-
ing support for the plan. Efforts began to secure a significant
pool of funding to publicize the environmental benefits of the
package.' 3
The bipartisan support for the plan quickly deterio-
rated.14 As details of the spending plan to cut tax ratios be-
came clear, Republicans declared the plan too burdensome,
arguing that it relied too heavily on tax increases.1 5 Never-
theless, no one thought the package would pass without in-
cluding the Btu tax, because of its revenue-generating power.
Perhaps it was time to wean ourselves away from our reli-
ance on cheap energy.
12. White House, supra note 9, at G-9.
13. Ruth Marcos and Ann Devroy, Asking Americans to "Face Facts," Clin-
ton Presents Plan to Raise Taxes, Cut Deficit, WASH. PoST, Feb. 18, 1993, at Al.
14. House Poised to Act on Clinton Tax Plan; Compromise Seen Possible in
Senate, DAILy TAX REP. (BNA) No. 98, at G-5, 6 (May 24, 1993) [hereinafter
House Poised].
15. Business Groups Line Up on Both Sides of Tax Package to Sway House




While broad political debate was generally in favor of the
Btu tax, nearly every industry began to calculate the impact
of the proposed tax. Hordes of lobbyists and friends of Capi-
tol Hill informed the Administration that the tax was too on-
erous and that a few accommodations were necessary to
make it more palatable.
By the time the Budget Resolution reached the Senate
floor for consideration, key grievances with the Btu tax had
been identified.16 It was clear that the Btu tax had become
one of the most contentious issues in the budget package.
Nonetheless, champions offered amendments to alter the tax.
Some Democratic amendments were designed to give Sena-
tors a chance to support the interests of their home states.
The Republican amendments, on the other hand, were more
restrictive, weakening the Btu tax as a deficit reduction mea-
sure. It was clear the Btu tax would take some hits during
the legislative process, but it emerged from the first round
intact, except for one fatal action concerning ethanol. Sena-
tors from the cornbelt had pressured the Treasury Depart-
ment to agree to exempt ethanol from the tax.17 The Senate,
however, rejected two amendments, one binding and one not,
to do that very thing, exempt ethanol. 18 The Administration
had made a terrible miscalculation. It had given away some-
thing it did not have to concede. The damage was done. It
became clear that the Administration would not fight over
the details of its plan and could be readily persuaded to alter
provisions in order to gain favor with key constituencies.
Less than a week later, Senator Max Baucus of Montana
and other Western democrats complained to President Clin-
ton about the inclusion of the public lands provision, such as
16. House-Senate Reconciliation Conference to Address More Than Just En-
ergy Tax, DAILY TAX REP. (BNA) No. 123, at G-4, 5 (June 29, 1993) [hereinafter
House-Senate].
17. Jessica Tuchman Mathews, Energy Tax Options, WASH. POST, July 30,
1990, at All.
18. Ways and Means Approves Clinton Tax Plan after Making Major
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the grazing feed increases in the package. 19 To the disbelief
of the Senators, Clinton agreed to strip the grazing provision
from the bill. Consequently, House Members who advocated
the reform of public land policies were outraged.
A few days later, the Treasury Department issued a re-
vised Btu proposal containing a number of changes that key
constituents had sought.20 The exemption of ethanol from
the tax was one of these changes.21 As a result, home heating
oil, which is important to the Northeast, was no longer to be
taxed at the supplemental rate, and the point of collection
was to be moved downstream.
To make matters worse, the stimulus bill, the first big
legislative proposal of the Clinton Administration, was de-
feated in the Senate.22 Republicans were stunned by the
overt partisan strategy of the Administration and stiffened
their partisan spines. Thus, the likelihood of a bipartisan
support for the deficit reduction program was grim.
The temperament in Washington had quickly changed.
What once looked like easy victories for the Clinton Adminis-
tration were now very uncertain.
V. Industry's Lobbying and Public Relations Machines
Rev Their Engines
The opponents of the energy tax smelled blood. There
was an avalanche of requests for more accommodations from
Capitol Hill and the White House. Hydropower-dependent
utilities argued for a lower rate of tax; the aluminum indus-
try maintained the electricity was a feedstock, and therefore,
should be exempt; and farmers contended that diesel fuel
used on farms should be exempt.23 In addition, concessions
19. Senator Max Baucus, Address at 103rd Cong., 1st Sess. on Energy Tax
Policy, 139 Cong. Rec. No. 93, S8207 (daily ed. June 22, 1993) (statement of
Sen. Baucus).
20. Ways and Means, supra note 18, at G-6.
21. Id.
22. Senate Kills Economic Stimulus Plan, Votes Extension of Unemploy-
ment Benefits, DAILY TAX REP. (BNA) No. 76, at G-14 (Apr. 22, 1993).
23. Debate Rages over Point of Collection for Clinton Energy Tax, Details
Unclear, DAILY TAx REP. (BNA) No. 50, at G-9, 10 (Mar. 17, 1993).
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol12/iss1/9
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made by the Administration did not preclude anyone from
seeking further compromises in the legislative arena.
Previously disparate efforts by the industrial community
to seek exemptions from and changes to the Btu tax began to
coalesce. In April, the National Association of Manufacturers
(NAM) formed the American Energy Alliance (Alliance) to
combat the tax.2 At the time, they believed that killing the
tax was a long shot. Nonetheless, they distilled a simple,
broad message: the Btu tax would increase the cost of pro-
ducing goods and thus hurt competitiveness. Furthermore,
Jerry Jasinowski, chairman of the Alliance and President of
NAM, contended that the proposed tax would cost as many as
600,000 jobs.25
The coalition grew and grew, with well in excess of 1,000
members from around the country. The self-described largest
coalition of business interests ever to oppose a single legisla-
tive proposal focused its efforts on five energy-intensive
states (Wyoming, Texas, North Dakota, Louisiana and West
Virginia), hoping to build support against the tax. Mean-
while, Citizens for a Sound Economy, with its 250,000 mem-
bers, staged protest rallies in North Dakota, Oklahoma,
Louisiana and Montana, attacking the tax as the worst possi-
ble tax we could use to reduce the budget deficit.26
Further opposition arose from the Affordable Energy Al-
liance and the American Petroleum Institute (API).2 In fact,
API pledged to spend nearly five million dollars to defeat the
Btu tax. Utilities sent mailers to all their customers blasting
the tax. In Michigan and Nebraska, utilities ran full-page
ads calling the Btu tax a "job destroyer." Opponents also ran
television ads in Louisiana, Oklahoma, Montana and North
Dakota.
Some industry groups, however, avoided the shrill, con-
frontational tactics of API and others, while still adamantly
opposing the tax. Notable for its congenial relations with the
24. Business Groups, supra note 15, at G-5.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Bentsen Defends Clinton's Tax Proposal; API-Commissioned Study
Predicts Job Losses, DAnLY TAx REP. (BNA) No. 93, at G-4 (May 17, 1993).
1994]
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White House, the natural gas industry managed to quietly
receive a number of concessions, while continuing to oppose
the tax.
Industries that might have stood to benefit from the tax,
such as energy efficiency companies, were absent from the de-
bate. Other companies that one would expect might support
energy taxes as an alternative to higher corporate taxes, such
as Citicorp, opposed the Btu tax because it would hurt many
of its clients.
VI. The Btu Enters the Legislative Fray
While appeals for exemption were clogging the hallway
outside the cavernous House Ways and Means Committee
room, Democrats in the committee showed tremendous cour-
age and discipline. Led by Representative Dan Rostenkowski
(D-ll.), the Democrats unanimously passed the President's
budget plan intact, with the Btu tax included. 28 As passed,
the plan remained relatively unchanged from the Treasury's
latest version.
On the House floor, the Democrats narrowly prevailed
and passed the plan with the Btu tax as the Ways and Means
Committee had crafted it.29 However, the plan was not
passed without the Republicans reminding all who were lis-
tening of the pain the Btu tax would bring. Each Republican
who rose to speak on the House floor declared the specific
number of jobs that would be lost in his or her district due to
the Btu tax. Then, the Republicans would proceed to inform
Democrats who had previously spoken how many jobs would
be lost in their respective democratic districts.
Next, the action turned to the Senate Finance Commit-
tee, led by Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan (D-N.Y.).30 The
Republicans on the committee were solidly against the plan.
28. Ways and Means Approves Clinton Tax Plan with Changes, DAILy TAX
REP. (BNA) No. 92, at G-4 (May 14, 1993).
29. House Adopts Budget Reconciliation Bill by Narrow Margin of 219-213,
DAILY TAX REP. (BNA) No. 102, at G-4 (May 27, 1993). See also Clinton Praises
Approval of Budget Bill, LEGAL INTELLIGNCER, at 5 (June 28, 1993).
30. Clinton Plan Faces New Challenge in Senate, DAILY TAX RE. (BNA) No.
103, at G-4 (May 28, 1993).
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol12/iss1/9
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For them, the overall package had too many tax increases.
Thus, with only a narrow eleven to nine Democratic majority,
each Democrat on the Finance Committee held power to block
the President's plan.
The Democrat that seized the power was Senator David
Boren of Oklahoma. His primary target was the Btu tax and
he wanted it out.31 Boren also asserted that the package
should be crafted with bipartisan support and should contain
more spending cuts and fewer taxes.
Senator Boren teamed up with fellow Committee mem-
ber Senator Jack Danforth (R-Mo.) to craft an alternative
plan.3 2 Their plan eliminated the energy tax and made up for
the lost revenues by cutting a number of programs for the
poor. Boren's alternative was denounced, but he refused to
budge in his opposition to the President's plan. The Commit-
tee had no choice but to strike the energy tax. They did so
and replaced it with a 4.3 cent per gallon gasoline tax.33
Advocates for the Btu tax had hoped that the conference
agreement between the House and the Senate would include
some form of a broad-based energy tax, but the politics had
become too poisoned. Even thoughtful and progressive mem-
bers such as Representative David Obey (D-Wis.) called for
elimination of the Btu tax. This was not because they did not
like energy taxes, but because the Btu tax was the only mid-
dle class tax in the President's plan, and Clinton had cam-
paigned on a middle class tax cut. Other House Democrats
who had voted for the House bill with the Btu tax, such as
Representative Charles Stenholm (D-Tex.), declared that
they would not vote for the final bill if it still contained the
Btu tax.34 In fact, Representative Stenhohm admitted, "I
voted for the Btu tax because I knew it would never become
31. Boren Still Urging More Spending Cuts, Btu Tax Changes in Deficit Re-
duction Plan, DAmy TAX REP. (BNA) No. 108, at G-6 (June 8, 1993).
32. Senators Boren, Danforth Would Kill Btu Tax in Alternative Deficit Re-
duction Plan, DAmI TAX REP. (BNA) No. 97, at G-10 (May 21, 1993).
33. House-Senate, supra note 16, at G-4.
34. House-Senate Conference Disputes Likely Over Transportations Tax,
Brewster Says, DAiLY TAX REP. (BNA) No. 115, at G-13 (June 17, 1993).
1994]
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law."3 5 Plagued with such dissolution of support, the Presi-
dent did not have a vote to spare in either body.
VII. Environmental Disenchantment
With the defeat of the stimulus bill and the removal of
public lands tax increases from the budget package, enthusi-
asm for the President's plan waned considerably among envi-
ronmentalists. Even though the Btu tax remained in the
plan, large grassroots organizations in the environmental
community decided that the Btu tax had been revised beyond
recognition, and that activists would not be excited about
fighting for it.
That decision essentially left the battle for the Btu tax to
the environmentalists inside the Washington beltway. Faced
with a nationwide barrage of orchestrated efforts by indus-
tries, it was only a matter of time before opposition to the tax
would overwhelm it.
The environmental community made a valiant attempt
to salvage the tax with its repeated proposals to address key
complaints such as international competitiveness, but these
"technical fixes" were lost in the noise. Throughout the pro-
cess, various environmental groups produced information
which refuted industry claims, but these groups lacked the
resources to effectively communicate their findings. For ex-
ample, the Institute for Local Self-Reliance easily demon-
strated how industry, farmers and homeowners could beat
the tax with low-cost efficiency investments.36 Also, the
American Council for an Energy Efficient Economy demon-
strated that the tax would create at least 40,000 jobs nation-
wide.37 However, hard analyses that undermined industry's
predictions of dire consequences were rarely reported. For
35. Id.
36. Brad Knickerbocker, The Recycling Payoff in the Energy Tax Plan,
CHmSTiA Sci. MONITOR, June 7, 1993, at 13. Studies by the Institute for Local
Self Reliance, a non-profit research and educational organization, show that
farmers, manufacturers and homeowners can reduce their energy consumption
by six percent. Id.
37. Two Studies Link Jobs and Energy Taxes - and Come to Opposite Con-
clusions, 3 ENERGY EcoN. CImwATE CHANGE, No. 5, 1 (May 1993).
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol12/iss1/9
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example, despite knowledge that energy is only a relatively
modest factor of production, industrial groups successfully
claimed that manufacturing would be devastated by the im-
position of the Btu tax.38 Thus, without adequate political
capital, attempts by environmentalists to salvage the Btu tax
were in vain.
Although last-ditch efforts were made to retain some
semblance of a broad-based energy tax, like a utility tax cou-
pled with a transportation tax, for all intents and purposes,
the energy tax was dead.3 9
VIII. Conclusion: Death and Taxes
In the end, if the Btu tax had not been killed, it would
have sunk under it's own weight. For President Clinton, the
Btu tax had become a lightening rod of general discontent. It
had been poked full of holes by the many committees and
worn thin to the bone by legislators who handled it. The tax
that had once been based on sound economics and ecology
was now based on political favoritism.
As exemptions grew, the twin justifications for the tax,
deficit reduction and environmental protection, crumbled.
The concessions both disrupted the regional balance of the
tax and lost significant revenue. As the concessions in-
creased, the tax's appeal to deficit hawks and environmen-
tally-minded legislators evaporated. Furthermore, tax
experts on Capitol Hill and elsewhere now believed that the
tax had become untenable.
Many different parties contributed to the demise of the
Btu tax. Industry, armed with enormous resources, master-
fully targeted vulnerable members of Congress to ensure
their opposition to the tax. In fact, the very industry groups
38. See Bill Mintz, Clinton Agrees to Compromise; Senate Resistance Kills
Btu Tax, Hous. CHRON., June 9,1993, at Al (claiming that the main objection of
the industries is that if taxed, their goods would have to compete in interna-
tional markets against goods not subject to this tax).
39. Presidents Plan Will Require Energy Tax, Panetta Says; Conferees
Leave Issue Open, DAnLy TAX REP. (BNA) No. 138, at G-7 (July 21, 1993). See
also, Environmental Impact of Gasoline Tax Characterized as Minimal to Negli-
gible, DAmY TAX REP. (BNA) No. 153, at G-6, 7 (Aug. 11, 1993).
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that worked the hardest to relieve the burden of the tax on
industry, by pushing it onto consumers, suddenly pivoted po-
litically, declaring the tax unreasonably burdensome on con-
sumers since industry would escape from the tax unscathed.
The environmental community also contributed to the bill's
demise as environmentalists, disillusioned with the evolving
bill, lacked the strong support required for the bill to pass.
These dynamics of discontent created an atmosphere in
which members of Congress who were opponents of the tax
actively fought it while members of Congress who favored the
tax became silent, passive supporters. The Clinton Adminis-
tration proved to have neither a commitment to nor a clear
strategy regarding the energy tax. In fact, the strategy ap-
peared to be an avoidance of the topic. By and large, most
attacks on the bill went unanswered by the Administration.
Perhaps most importantly, the President failed to per-
suade the public as he had persuaded some economists and
editorial writers. He was unable to invoke public understand-
ing that energy taxes are more beneficial to the country than
other taxes, like consumption taxes, because they discourage
pollution. The message of what the country stood to gain
from the enactment of the Btu tax never, in this legislative
travesty, reached the ears, or minds, of the people.
In the end, elite Washington advocates of the broad-
based energy tax as well as environmental groups who sup-
ported the Btu tax mustered neither the political capital nor
the public persuasion necessary to see the Btu tax to fruition.
12http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol12/iss1/9
